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Be Not The First By Whom The New Are Tried, Nor
Yet The Last To Lay The Old Aside:' Is The Present
Sense Impression Exception To The Rule Against
Hearsay The Law Of Pennsylvania?
Robert Berkley Harper*
I. INTRODUCTION
The "heard said" or hearsay rule is probably the best known, and
at the same time, the least understood, of the Anglo-American
rules of evidence.2 The aversion to the hearsay rule is partially due
to the numerous exceptions that have developed over the past
three centuries.3 As a result of the numerous exceptions to the
hearsay rule, some have called for the elimination of this rule of
exclusion altogether.4 But the rule against hearsay remains alive
and well, living in the law books, law school classes, on bar exami-
nations and in the courts of the land. Seldom, if ever, is a trial
conducted without counsel for one or all parties considering or ac-
tually making an objection to the admission of evidence based
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. Alexander Pope, Essay on Criticism, 1. 335-36 (1711).
2. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 244, at 724-26 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinaf-
ter cited as McCormick (3d ed.)].
3. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980).
4. Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U. OF PrTT. L. REV. 609 (1974).
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upon the rule against hearsay.
The law of evidence is undergoing major evaluation and modern-
ization in the majority of jurisdictions. Much of the change is the
result of Congress adopting the Federal Rules of Evidence for fed-
eral courts in 1975.6 Following the federal lead, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws patterned the
uniform rules on the final draft of the proposed Federal Rules and
recommended their adoption in all states.7 Twenty-nine states, the
military and Puerto Rico now have rules similar to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.8 Other jurisdictions are studying the rules and
may adopt them. In jurisdictions that have not adopted the rules,
several courts have nevertheless adopted individual rules during
the process of deciding cases.9 The Federal Rules are having an
enormous impact on the law of evidence in this country. The phe-
nomenon is similar to the aftermath of the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 after which all states today pat-
tern rules of civil procedure.
Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence sets forth an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule which embraces statements made by a
declarant during or immediately following the event or condition
that occasioned the statement.10 The formulation of this exception
5. BINDER, HEARSAY HANDBOOK 85 (2d ed. 1983).
6. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified at 28 U.S.C. app. at
539-605 (1976)).
7. See UNIF. R. EVID., 13 U.L.A. 209 (1974). Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Florida, Ha-
waii, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Da-
kota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming have adopted the Uniform
Rules. UNIF. R. EVID., 13 U.L.A. 8 (Supp. 1982).
8. Because the Uniform Rules are based on the Supreme Court's final proposed draft
of the Federal Rules, this includes the states that have adopted the Uniform Rules. ALASKA
R. EviD.; ARIz. R. EVID.; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (Supp. 1981); COLO. R. EVID.; DEL. UNIF.
R. EVID.; FLA. R. EVID.; HAW. R. EVID.; IOWA R. EVID.; KANSAS C.C.P. § 60-460(d); ME. R. EVID.;
MICH. R. EVID.; MINN. R. EVID.; MONT. R. EvID.; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-101 (1979); NaV. REV.
STAT. § 47.020 (1977); N.H. R. Evd. (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4.101 (Supp. 1975); N.C. R.
EVID. (1984); N.D. R. EvID.; OHIo R. EVID.; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 2101 (1980); OR. LAWS ch.
891, H.B. 2030 (1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-9-1 (1979); WASH. R. EVID.; W.VA. R.
EvD. (1985); WIS. STAT. § 901.01 (1977); Wyo. R. EviD. See generally 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINST EIN'S EVIDENCE, "Note on State Adaptation of Federal Rules of Evidence;
MIlitary Rules of Evidence," T-1 & T-2 (1985).
The Federal Rules of Evidence have also been adopted for military trials. Exec. Order No.
12,233, 3 C.F.R. 276 (1981); Exec. Order No. 12,198, 3 C.F.R. 151 (1981); 1 J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, supra, at T-2.
9. See, e.g., State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1979); Illinois, Ohio and Tennessee
courts have also adopted individual rules. See 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra, at T-3 to
-4.
10. Federal Rule of Evidence 803 reads in part as follows:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is
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is part of the trend toward permitting the finder of fact to weigh
reliability in admitting certain types of testimony offered in court
by one other than the declarant and offered for the truth of its
content. Several times the Pennsylvania courts have indicated a
willingness to follow the lead of the many states that have adopted
the present sense impression exception to the rule against
hearsay."
The main purpose of this article is to address the merits of the
present sense impression exception to the rule against hearsay as
an exception worthy of being included among other accepted ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule in Pennsylvania. The case law used in
this article will emphasize Pennsylvania cases that have discussed
the present sense impression exception. The article will also dis-
cuss problems that have to be considered with this relatively new
exception as it relates to the Confrontation Clause. In conclusion,
the article will provide guidelines that may be followed to clarify
the law of Pennsylvania as it relates to the present sense impres-
sion exception to the rule against hearsay.
available as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condi-
tion made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter.
FED R. EvID. 803(1).
11. The Pennsylvania appellate courts have discussed the present sense impression
exception to the hearsay rule on several occasions, but very seldom has a court expressly
held that this exception applied to the factual situation before it. See the discussion of
Commonwealth v. Coleman which follows and Eller v. Work, 233 Pa. Super. 186, 336 A.2d
645 (1975); Commonwealth v. Cooley, 465 Pa. 35, 348 A.2d 103 (1975); Commonwealth v.
Farquharson, 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (1976); Lininger v. Kromer, 238 Pa. Super. 259, 358
A.2d 89 (1976); Williamson v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 244 Pa. Super. 492, 368 A.2d 1292
(1976); Commonwealth v. Pronkoski, 477 Pa. 132, 383 A.2d 858 (1977); Commonwealth v.
McIntosh, 258 Pa. Super. 101, 392 A.2d 704 (1978); Commonwealth v. Gore, 262 Pa. Super.
540, 396 A.2d 1302 (1978); Commonwealth v. Summer, 269 Pa. Super. 437, 410 A.2d 336
(1979); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 273 Pa. Super. 337, 417 A.2d 677 (1979); Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board v. Melting Pot, Inc., 55 Pa. C. 418, 423 A.2d 1095 (1980); Common-
wealth v.Whiting, 278 Pa. Super. 519, 420 A.2d 662 (1980); DeFrancesco v. Western Penn-
sylvania Water, 329 Pa. Super. 508, 478 A.2d 1295 (1984); Kemp v. Qualls, 326 Pa. Super.
319, 473 A.2d 1369 (1984) (The argument raised in the lower court to support the admission
of the testimony in issue was not maintained on appeal. Thus, the question of whether or
not the testimony could qualify as a present sense impression, which was a new reason on
appeal, the court found was of no consequence.). Commonwealth v. Peterkin, - Pa. -,
513 A.2d 373 (1986) (The trial court admitted testimony under the state of mind exception
to the hearsay rule; the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania found the statement should have
been admitted but under the present sense impression exception as a contemporaneous
verbalization of the present observations of events occurring before the declarant.).
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II. A TIME TO LAY ASIDE "RES GESTAE"
Pennsylvania courts have not always analyzed the admission of
hearsay evidence closely, but have instead admitted contempora-
neous but unexcited utterances under the rubric of "res gestae.""
Often when this term is applied by courts, the evidence admitted is
either not hearsay and thus needs no exception, or, if it is hearsay,
it has some other rational explanation for its admission.13 "Res
gestae" has flourished as a convenient "catch-all" and as words of
magic to ease the conscience of courts in escaping the hearsay rule
of exclusion when they feel certain telling evidence ought to be
considered. 4 Even today, trial courts admit evidence under the res
gestae heading and require litigants to appeal for a determination
if the evidence admitted is within one of the recognized
categories.' 5
The term res gestae means an exploit or deed. The literal trans-
lation of the phrase is "thing done." Originally, the phrase was
used to indicate that an evidentiary fact was admissible as an inte-
gral detail bearing on the nature or existence of the litigated trans-
action.'6 The term "res gestae" seems to have come into common
usage in the early 1800's, at a time when the theory of hearsay was
not well developed, and the various exceptions to the hearsay rule
were not clearly defined.
17
The present sense impression exception to the rule against hear-
say was probably first articulated by Professor Thayer in his exam-
ination of cases that admitted hearsay under res gestae.18 Thayer
explained the exception as dealing with "statements, oral or writ-
12. See Commonwealth v. Craven, 138 Pa. Super. 436, 11 A.2d 191 (1940); Common-
wealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 760 (1952).
13. Comment, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 DICK. L. REV. 347, 348 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 81
DICK. L. REV. 347].
14. Thayer observed that "lawyers and judges seem to have caught at the term 'res
gestae' . . . as one that gave them relief at a pinch." Thayer, Bendingfield
Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L. REV. 1, 71 (1881) [hereinafter
cited as Thayer, 15 AM. L. REV. 71]. See Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to
the Rule Against Hearsay: Origins and Attributes, 66 IowA L. REV. 869, 869-70 (1981).
15. In the most recent case in this area, Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 343 Pa. Super.
201, 494 A.2d 426 (1985), the trial court overruled the objections to the admission of the
out-of-court declaration and admitted the evidence under the "res gestae exception to the
hearsay rule." 494 A.2d at 430. See Comment, 81 DICK. L. REv. 347, 348.
16. See The Queen v. Took, 25 Howell State Trials 440 (1794); S. PHIPSON, EVIDENCE
174-75 (11th ed. 1970).
17. MCCORMICK § 288, at 835 (3d ed.).
18. Thayer, 15 AM. L. REV. (Pt. 3) (1881).
Vol. 25:1
Present Sense Impression
ten, made by those present when a thing took place, made about it,
and importing what is present at the very time,-present, either in
itself or in some fresh indication of it. . "19 The cases examined
by Thayer all rely very heavily on the contemporaneity of the de-
clarant's statement with the event being described. 0
Res gestae, a concept of cloudy origin, has existed in the law of
evidence for more than a century, always evading clarification.
This concept has been applied to evidence that is not hearsay and
thus needs no exception for its admissibility,22 as well as to other
evidence that would come within a recognized exception to the
hearsay rule. McCormick stated that within the scope of res gestae
there exist four distinct exceptions to the hearsay rule, all possess-
ing different indicia of reliability: (1) declarations of present bodily
condition; (2) declarations of present mental state and emotion; (3)
excited utterances; and (4) declarations of present sense
impression.23
One of the most complete, scholarly and discriminating disserta-
tions upon the subject matter covered under the term "res gestae"
was published by Professor M.C. Slough of the University of Kan-
sas and entitled Res Gestae2 Professor Slough was not ashamed
of using a term that had been criticized by so many of his peers.
He stated that "[ilt seems impractical, if not impossible, to turn
our backs upon the phrase, because in doing so we only pretend
that our difficulties are being met. Disparaging remarks will not
stifle a thought so well entrenched. ' 2 He believed that if the
phrase were used to include spontaneous and contemporaneous
declarations as those terms were used by Wigmore and Thayer,
and no more, a spark of certainty would result and most of the
current ambiguity would disappear. He concluded that a well-de-
fined and conservative use of the term is more realistic than would
19. Id. at 83.
20. Thayer relied heavily on other cases: Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng. Rep. 1057
(K.B. 1693); Commonwealth v. Hacket, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 136 (1861); Commonwealth v.
McPike, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 181 (1849); and Insurance Co. v. Mosley, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 397
(1869).
21. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay:
Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REv. 869 (1981).
22. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942) is often cited as a
seminal case recognizing a present sense impression as an exception to the hearsay rule. The
assertion in this case was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus it could
be argued that this was not a case of hearsay.
23. McCoRMICK § 288, at 835 (3d ed.).
24. Slough, Res Gestae, 2 U. KAN. L. REv. 246 (1954).




But the term res gestae continues to be used and applied to sev-
eral concepts, thus inviting confusion.2 7 Since every rule of evi-
dence to which the res gestae rule applies exists as a part of some
other well-established principle and can be explained in terms of
that principle, the underlying principle should be used. Permitting
lawyers and courts to use the general term of res gestae leads to
the harmful result of substituting one rule for another, and this in
turn leads to uncertainty as to the limitations of both.28 There are
other significant terms in the law such as "res judicata," "res ipsa
loquitur," "prima facie" and "presumptions," which have chal-
lenged the imagination of many. Yet none of these have been per-
mitted to spill over upon a legal area as broad and encompassing
as that claimed by res gestae.2 9
The law is often what the court says it is. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania, among others, has stated that there is no "res gestae
exception" to the hearsay rules of Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, ref-
erences to the "res gestae exception" continue to occur, sometimes
without an explanation of which of the distinct exceptions with
reference to res gestae is meant."1 Vagueness in the law of evidence
is unacceptable, because it undermines the integrity of the system
and fails to promote the public perception of fairness. The law of
evidence should be exact and judges and lawyers should not be
permitted to avoid the toilsome exertion of exact analysis and pre-
cise thinking by use of a trick term like "res gestae." The reasoning
involved in the decision to admit testimony should be the primary
consideration. 2 Lawyers and judges should not be permitted to re-
26. Id.
27. Judge Learned Hand stated in United States v. Matot, 146 F.2d 197, 198 (2d Cir.
1944): "[Als for 'res gestae,' it is a phrase which has been accountable for so much confusion
that it has best be denied any place whatever in legal terminology; it means anything but an
unwillingness to think at all, what it covers cannot be put in less intelligible terms."
28. Wigmore was characteristically blunt, denominating "res gestae" as "not only en-
tirely useless, but even positively harmful. It is useless, because every rule of evidence to
which it has been applied exists as a part of some other well-established principle and can,
be explained in the terms of that principle. It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it invites
the confusion of one rule with another and thus creates uncertainty as to the limitations of
both. It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated as a vicious element in our legal phraseol-
ogy. No rule of evidence can be created or applied by the mere muttering of a shibboleth." 6
WiGMoRE § 17767, at 255 (Chadboun rev.).
29. Slough, supra note 11, at 281.
30. Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 343 Pa. Super. 201, 208-209, 494 A.2d 426, 430
(1985).
31. Id.
32. Slough, supra note 11, at 282.
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fer to a particular exception by a generic designation.23 Rather,
courts should discard the term "res gestae" in favor of the distinct
exceptions which are involved.
III. PENNSYLVANIA CASELAW ON PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS
On several occasions appellate courts of Pennsylvania have un-
dertaken the task of stripping the concept of "res gestae" of the
verbiage which has shrouded it for more than a century, and re-
stating the concepts contained in it as reasonably definite princi-
ples with a sound psychological rationale by which to determine
their scope and applicability.3 4 In 1978, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court recognized that within the "res gestae" analysis of Pennsyl-
vania law there are actually a number of separate hearsay excep-
tions.3 5 The court included in its list the present sense impression
exception to the rule against hearsay. By stating that the present
sense impression is recognized under the "res gestae" rubric,3 6 the
status of this exception has remained vague and obscure. Not only
did the court discuss the exception as part of "res gestae," but the
court's pronouncement as to this being the law of Pennsylvania
was in the form of dictum.
37
Four years earlier, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania first at-
tempted to clarify the "res gestae" rubric and also attempted to
change the law with the addition of the present sense impression
exception as a decisional rule. In Commonwealth v. Coleman,38 the
out-of-court statement made by the victim of a homicide to her
mother over the telephone was considered for admission into evi-
dence. The defendant was charged with aggravated assault and
battery, assault with intent to kill, and murder as the result of the
death of his girlfriend. The trial court admitted the testimony of
the deceased's mother, who stated that she had received a tele-
33. In Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974) the court states:
"The practice in many courts, including those of this Commonwealth, has been to refer to
the particular exception by the generic designation." Id. at 116, 326 A.2d at 389.
34. See supra note 11.
35. In Commonwealth v. Pronkoski, 477 Pa. 132, 136-37, 383 A.2d 858, 860 (1978), the
court stated, "As we have recognized, 'res gestae' is actually a generic term encompassing
four discrete exceptions to the hearsay rule: (1) declarations as to present bodily conditions;
(2) declarations as to present mental states and emotions; (3) excited utterances; and (4)
declarations of present sense impressions."
36. Pronkoski held that the declaration made by the victim's young daughter that her
Daddy shot her Mommy did not fall within the excited utterance "res gestae" exception to
the hearsay rule. Id.
37. Id. at 137, 383 A.2d at 860.
38. 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974).
1986
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phone call from her daughter on the day of the murder. In this
conversation, the daughter begged her mother not to hang up be-
cause "as soon as the phone was hung up Coleman would kill
her."3 9 The mother testified that she could hear shouting in the
background and the defendant himself testified that he and his
girlfriend had argued loudly immediately prior to the telephone
call. He was convicted on all charges, including second degree mur-
der, and sentenced to a term of ten to twenty years
imprisonment.0
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania the conviction
of the defendant was affirmed. The Court held that the admitted
statements qualified as present sense impression declarations and
were properly admitted by the court below. The Court stated:
Various courts throughout the United States have embraced the precepts
underlying an exception to the hearsay rule for declarations of present sense
impressions. Of particular pertinence to our considerations in this case is
the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Houston Oxygen v. Davis,
139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942) .... It found that the evidential value of
the remark was more than merely reliability in that it was contemporaneous
in time with the observation, was safe from any defect in memory or oppor-
tunity for calculated misstatement, and had been made to the testifying
witness who had an equal opportunity to observe and hence to check a mis-
statement .... Indeed, Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence pro-
vides for the admissibility of declarations of present sense impression made
either during or immediately after perception of the event or condition.
... [w]e do not consider the inability of the mother to have observed the
situation in the apartment to be sufficiently persuasive in effect to disallow
application of the exception. Verification has never been deemed an abso-
lute prerequisite to admissibility of testimony under this Court's previous
treatment of res gestae exceptions to the hearsay rule.41
The decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court seems to be a
proper application of Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
But the decision did make and should have made experienced trial
lawyers and judges uneasy by its result. Apprehension should arise
because the Court did not give a clear and complete explanation of
the exception, nor did it place limitations and safeguards on its
application.
42
Only two justices joined in the main opinion written by Chief
39. Commonwealth v. Coleman, 35 Lehigh L.J. 90, 91 (1972).
40. The law of Pennsylvania has changed and murder is now classified into three de-
grees. Coleman's conviction today would be that of third degree murder.
41. 458 Pa. at 119, 326 A.2d at 391.
42. See infra notes 181 to 211 and accompanying text.
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Justice Jones. Mr. Justice Pomeroy, in a separate opinion joined in
by Mr. Justice Nix and Mr. Justice Roberts, said that while a pre-
sent sense impression exception might be "a useful addition to the
law of Pennsylvania," it was unnecessary to justify admission on
that ground because the statement was an excited utterance. 43
Coleman presented a situation where the present sense impression
exception overlapped with the exception for excited utterances..
Often these two exceptions do overlap; since the evidence in the
case could have been admitted on other grounds, one wonders why
the court was inclined to make new law in this area. It is quite
possible that the court wanted to use this opportunity to 'join the
ranks of the "new."
44
Mr. Justice Eagen and Mr. Justice Manderino concurred in the
result of the case and did not join in either opinion. This raises an
interesting question: can two justices change the law of the state?
As a plurality opinion, the opinion in the case of Commonwealth v.
Coleman does not change state law.45 Yet Coleman is cited, and
continues to be cited, as the authority for the present sense im-
pression exception as the law of the state.46
In Commonwealth v. Farquharson, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, in a majority opinion, stated that an exception to the hear-
say rule for present sense impression is recognized as the law of
Pennsylvania.47 The court used as authority a superior court case
where the evidence was admitted under the "res gestae" heading. 4
43. 458 Pa. at 121, 326 A.2d at 391.
44. Mr.Justice Pomeroy noted in Commonwealth v. Coleman in his concurring opin-
ion: "[T]his exception would be a useful addition to the law of Pennsylvania relative to
hearsay evidence, it is not, in my view, applicable to the case at bar." 458 Pa. at 121.
45. Former Justice Roberts was a Mellon Lecturer at the University of Pittsburgh
School of Law in October 1984. In a conversation with Justice Roberts prior to the Mellon
Lecture, he stated that this was a plurality opinion and thus did not change the law of the
state. He saw no problem with the court establishing this as a decisional rule so long as
there were no constitutional limitations.
46. Commonwealth v. Coleman has been cited as authority in at least two dozen
Pennsylvania appeals court cases. In no case has the court found that the present sense
impression exception applied.
47. 467 Pa. 50, 354 A.2d 545 (1976). The Court stated in a footnote that present sense
impression would support the admission of a hearsay statement. Id. at 68 n.12, 354 A.2d at
554 n.12.
48. Commonwealth v. Craven, 138 Pa. Super. 436, 11 A.2d 191 (1940). This case ad-
mitted the statements of inmates as they related to their sufferings and efforts to obtain
relief. The statements were admitted against the warden, who was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter, in that "[t]hese contemporaneous statements were voluntarily and spontane-
ously made at the time of the occurrence and under circumstances which dispel the idea of a
design or motive for misrepresentation or invention, and were admissible as part of the res
gestae." Id. at 442, 11 A.2d at 194.
1986
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The court also cited Coleman as authority for this new exception,
but gave no explanation or guidelines as to how the exception
would be applied. After announcing this new exception as the law
of the Commonwealth, the court held that the testimony relating
to an argument between the victim and his assailant and a subse-
quent conversation with the victim was not admissible as a present
sense impression. Under the facts, the court believed the absence
of retrospective mental action was not sufficiently clear to justify
the admission of the evidence. 9
The decision in Coleman is indicative of the court's desire to en-
act this new exception as the law of the Commonwealth. But in
attempting to do so, the court selected a case in which the excep-
tion was not necessary and did not apply. As stated by Mr. Justice
Pomeroy, "[f]rom the evidence in the case at bar it is manifest that
both elements of the 'excited utterance' exception are pre-
sent. . . ."50 The courts in Pennsylvania have long held that spon-
taneous exclamations or declarations uttered during or immedi-
ately preceding or following the actual infliction of wounds are
admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.51 An attack on the
victim would surely qualify as "startling" and his or her statement
would have the element of "spontaneity."52
Moreover, the declarations in Coleman would be admissible on
other grounds. In defense of his conduct, the defendant testified
that he had been struck on the head with a bottle by the victim
and was attacked with a knife.53 The victim's statement represents
a typical example of nonhearsay use of declarant's out-of-court
statement to prove his or her mental state." The victim's out-of-
court statement relating violent acts committed by the defendant
is not offered to prove the truth of the statement-that the de-
fendant actually struck her-but rather that the victim believed
that the defendant was going to kill her. The fact of the victim's
fear leads reasonably and logically to the inference that having
49. 467 Pa. at 68, 354 A.2d at 554.
50. 458 Pa. at 122, 326 A.2d at 392.
51. See Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 760 (1952); Commonwealth v.
Edwards, 431 Pa. 44, 244 A.2d 683 (1966); Sadowski v. Eazor Express, 213 Pa. Super. 471,
249 A.2d 842 (1968) (statement admissible but insufficient to sustain plaintiff's burden of
proof.).
52. 458 Pa. at 123, 326 A.2d at 392.
53. 35 Lehigh L.J. at 92.
54. This would be a case of nonhearsay because the truth of her belief is not impor-
tant. But even if the truth was important, this would be admissible as an exception to the
rule against hearsay. See Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 803.
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such fear of the defendant, the victim would not have acted in an
aggressive manner toward him. The statement could have been
classified as nonhearsay and admitted as relevant evidence to show
the victim's state of mind.
As was stated in Coleman, "[o]f particular pertinence to our con-
sideration in this case is the decision of the Supreme Court of
Texas in Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis. 5 5 Not only was the Hous-
ton Oxygen case important to the Coleman decision, but the au-
thor of Coleman engaged in the same type of superficial analysis as
did the Texas court.
IV. PENNSYLVANIA FOLLOWS HOUSTON OXYGEN'S LEAD
The Pennsylvania courts have engaged in the same superficial
analysis that has plagued the present sense impression exception
since its inception. The inclusion of the 1942 opinion of Houston
Oxygen Co. v. Davis5" in leading evidence casebooks and many ref-
erences to it in commentaries of legal scholars has led to much of
the discussion that has been associated with the present sense im-
pression exception. 7 Even today, Houston Oxygen is cited as a
seminal case recognizing the present sense impression as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule.8 What is often not mentioned is that
Houston Oxygen is a discernibly racist decision, 59 produced by the
Texas Commission of Appeals to reduce a judgment obtained by a
black family.
Pearl Davis, a black woman, and her husband sued Houston Ox-
ygen Company for damages sustained by her son in a vehicular col-
lision. 60 The defendant filed a cross-claim against the driver of the
car in which the plaintiff was a passenger and alleged that the
cross-defendant's negligence in operating the automobile at an ex-
cessively high speed was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries.
The defendant attempted to prove his cross-claim at trial with
the testimony of Sally Cooper and her two companions, Jack Sand-
55. 458 Pa. at 117-18, 326 A.2d at 390.
56. 139 Tex. 1, 161 S.W.2d 474 (1942).
57. A more compelling case on its facts related to this subject is Tampa Electric Co. v.
Getrost, 151 Fla. 558, 10 So.2d 83 (1942) (action for wrongful death of lineman by electrocu-
tion; statement of fellow lineman that deceased had returned from nearby house and said he
had telephoned central station to deactivate line that they were going to work on).
58. See FED. R. EviD. 803 advisory committee's note. See also Commonwealth v.
Blackwell, 343 Pa. Super. 201, 212, 494 A.2d 426, 434 (1985).
59. See Waltz, supra note 21, at 883.
60. 139 Tex. at 3, 161 S.W.2d at 475.
1986
Duquesne Law Review V
ers and her brother-in-law M. C. Cooper. Sally Cooper and her two
companions were driving down the road when they were passed by
the decedent along with several passengers who were also black.
This incident occurred some four to five miles in advance of the
accident in question.6 1 At trial all three were called as witnesses,
and counsel unsuccessfully attempted to elicit from each Sally's
colorful statement that "they must have been drunk, that we
would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept that
rate of speed up." 2
Commissioner Taylor reversed the decision of the trial court,
which had been previously affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals,
and held the statement admissible." The Commissioner was un-
daunted by the lack of specificity of Sally's remark and its conjec-
tural aspects, and determined that the remark was "sufficiently
spontaneous to save it from the suspicion of being manufactured
evidence [since] [t]here was no time for a calculated statement.
'64
The remarks were treated as a present sense impression rather
than as an excited utterance. In support, the Commission pointed
to the description of the present sense impression declaration con-
tained in a treatise on Texas evidence law.6 5 That treatise set
forth, and the Commissioner quoted, three supposed safeguards
surrounding a present sense impression: contemporaneity of the
statement obviates any defect in memory; contemporaneity also
militates against "calculated misstatement"; and "the statement
will usually be made to another (the witness who reports it) who
would have equal opportunities to observe and hence to check a
misstatement."66
Significantly, the Houston Oxygen court admitted the state-
ment, holding that it was not cumulative because the witness was
alluding to an occurrence within her own knowledge in language
calculated to make her meaning clearer to the jury than would ex-
pressions of opinion as to speed alone.6 7 The court noted the con-
siderable value of such statements both in adding weight and em-
phasis to the testimony of the witness and as a valuable and
61. Id. at 5, 166 S.W.2d at 476.
62. Id.
63. The opinion was later adopted by the Texas Supreme Court. Id. at 7, 161 S.W.2d
at 477.
64. Id. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 476.
65. Id. The current version of the treatise is 1A R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 916,
at 158-60 (3d ed. 1980).
66. 139 Tex. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 476-77.
67. Id. at 5, 161 S.W.2d at 476.
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reliable way of proving the issue.68
There are several fallacies in the court's reasoning in the Hous-
ton Oxygen opinion. First, one questions whether the statements
in the out-of-court eyewitness testimony are repetitious and time-
wasting and should be excluded for these reasons alone.69 This is
especially true in light of the fact that the jury in Houston Oxygen
did not believe the witness on the stand and thus she should not
be able to add credit to her statement by her own or others' out-of-
court statements.
Second, the assertion that "we would find them somewhere on
the road wrecked if they kept that rate of speed up" is not a state-
ment of fact, but one of opinion by a witness who may not have
been qualified as an expert to give such an opinion. 7 This is the
type of opinion evidence which would require scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge or which would amount to specula-
tion on the part of the witness. But even as expert testimony, this
evidence may be excludable, because watching a car on the high-
way is not the basis "reasonably relied upon by experts in the par-
ticular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject . ..
Third, the assertion that "they must have been drunk" was not
something within Mrs. Cooper's personal knowledge and some-
thing that the other witness could reasonably corroborate. This
raises a serious question of firsthand knowledge on the part of the
witnesses. The statement was not that they were drunk, but that
they must have been drunk by their conduct or actions. This is a
situation in which the witness could give the jury the underlying
facts and let them draw their own conclusion 72 rather than con-
cluding for them.
Lastly and most important, Mrs. Cooper's assertion was not
hearsay. The statement was not offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted. 73 Thus, if the statement was not hearsay, there
was no reason for the court to make an exception to the rule
68. Id.
69. See FED. R. EvID. 403. This Rule provides that relevant evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially ouweighed by considerations of waste of time or need-
less presentation of cumulative evidence.
70. See FED. R. Eviw. 702; safeguards, infra notes 181 to 211 and accompanying text.
71. FED. R. EVID. 703.
72. As to the question of firsthand, see infra notes 98 to 116 and accompanying text.
73. The Federal Rules of Evidence give the general definition of hearsay in Rule 801:
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
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against hearsay for the admission of this statement. In this case,
the declarant was available and able to testify. This accords with
one of the basic precepts of evidence law-the "best" most reliable
evidence should be presented to the factfinder. This was done at
the trial level and was not believed. The appeals court should not
have worked so hard to reverse the judgment of the trial court by
creating a new exception to the rule against hearsay.
Houston Oxygen has probably contributed to the misconception
that is present today surrounding the present sense impression ex-
ception. The court in that case engaged in a type of reasoning simi-
lar to that which other courts have engaged in for such a long time
with the use of the "res gestae" doctrine. The Commissioner felt
that "telling" evidence should have been admitted and did so with-
out clearly thought-out reasoning. A careful reading of Houston
Oxygen should alert judges and legislators that much thought and
consideration should be given before enacting the present sense
impression as an exception to the rule against hearsay. Courts in
other jurisdictions should not blindly perpetuate the imperfections
of Houston Oxygen. Pennsylvania courts should make special ef-
forts in the analysis of cases to ensure that sound reasoning and
logic prevail-before following the holding of Houston Oxygen.
It would be appropriate at this time to review the foundational
basis for present sense impressions. With an understanding of the
foundational basis, one can better grasp the merits, if any, of the
present sense impression exception, as well as an understanding of
appropriate guidelines necessary if the exception is enacted.
V. THE BASIS FOR PRESENT SENSE IMPRESSIONS
The argument for admitting unexcited statements describing
present sense impressions has usually been based on a comparison
between statements of this kind and excited utterances, which are
usually admissible.74 The claim is that since excited utterances are
admissible and since contemporaneous but unexcited utterances
are likely to be more reliable than excited utterances, 5 it follows
"a fortiori" that there should be an exception for spontaneous but
74. See FED. R. Evm. 803(2). See generally MCCORMICK § 297, at 854-59.
75. Both clinical studies and real-life observation show that nervous stress produces
demonstrably less accurate statements; excitement impairs the sensory apparatus so that
what is gained in sincerity is lost in perception, memory and narration. See Hutchins &
Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of Evidence: Spontaneous Exclamations, 28
COLUM. L. REv. 432 (1928) (hereinafter cited as Hutchins & Slesinger].
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unexcited utterances."6 But people who react verbally to an unex-
pected, startling event are not, as a rule, exceptionally reliable ob-
servers.77 The introduction to a former television program clearly
illustrates this:
"Look! It's a bird."
"No, it's a plane."
"No, it's Superman."
But the conclusion that unexcited utterances should be admitted
because excited utterances are presently admitted does not clearly
follow. One could just as easily conclude that neither of these ut-
terances should be admitted as exceptions to the hearsay rule. But
it is not the purpose of this paper to attack the long-established
exception for excited utterances. The discussion of excited utter-
ances is used to emphasize the thought that there should exist
greater justification to adopt this new exception. That it is similar
to the much-criticized excited utterance exception is not enough.7s
Professor Morgan stated that it is unfortunate, given the danger
of unreliability caused by the emotional excitement required for
excited utterances, that we exclude other statements which may
have equal assurances of reliability.7 ' Under Morgan's leadership
there was a movement afoot to recognize another exception to the
hearsay rule for nonexciting events.80 This resulted in the present
sense impression exception. There are several important safe-
guards affecting the reliability of present sense impressions. A dis-
cussion of these safeguards follows, whereby an evaluation of the
merits of the exception, as well as the dangers associated with the
exception, can be considered.
76. See FED. R. EVID. 802. An older Pennsylvania case takes the view that the "res
gestae" exception is "a dangerous rule" which should not be extended beyond spontaneous
utterances caused by the exciting event. Commonwealth v. Noble, 371 Pa. 138, 144-45, 88
A.2d 760, 763 (1952).
77. Dean Hutchins and Donald Slesinger pointed out long ago that psychological stud-
ies have demonstrated that perceptual accuracy and judgment are inversely proportioned to
the startling nature of an event. They concluded that "[w]hat the emotion gains by way of
overcoming the desire to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation."
Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 75, at 439.
78. See MCCORMICK § 297, at 855, wherein Professor McCormick states that "[tihe
entire basis for the exception is, of course, subject to question." Id. See also Hutchins &
Slesinger, supra note 75.
79. Morgan, Res Gestae, 12 WAsH. L. Rav. 91, 96 (1937).




Professor Morgan took the position that both the statement of
present sense impressions' and the excited utterance 2 are viable
hearsay exceptions. He approved the former because of its sponta-
neity and contemporaneity, and the latter solely because of its
spontaneity. He viewed the present sense impression exception as
having essentially the same indicia of reliability as statements of
existing mental or bodily condition: all are "spontaneously" ut-
tered and therefore, in Morgan's opinion, probably truthful. He
distinguished contemporaneity, indicating that statements which
were made "contemporaneously" with an occurrence at the place
of the occurrence "were open to perception by the senses of the
person to whom the declaration is made and by whom it is usually
reported on the witness stand."83 Following Morgan's lead, other
commentators have argued for the acceptance of the present sense
impression as a more reliable exception than the excited utter-
ance.8 4 Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) excepts from the hearsay
rule statements which describe or explain any event regardless of
the identity of the actor or the time at which the statement is
made.85
The theory that spontaneity is sufficient as a guarantee of the
declarant's sincerity is premised on the assumption that all distor-
tion of what is accurately perceived is necessarily the product of
deliberative thought. So long as an utterance occurs quickly
enough upon perception of an event, is wrenched from the declar-
ant by the episode and is relatively narrow in scope, simply
describing or explaining that which is perceived, it is deemed spon-
taneous enough to assure sincerity and dispense with the need for
81. The present sense impression involves "[clases in which the utterance is contem-
poraneous with a non-verbal act, independently admissible, relating to that act and throw-
ing some light upon it." Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as
Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229, 236 (1922).
82. The excited utterance involves "[c]ases in which the utterance is made concerning
a startling event by a declarant laboring under such a stress of nervous excitement, caused
by that event, as to make such utterance spontaneous and unreflective." Id. at 238.
83. Id. at 236.
84. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 75.
85. Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines a "present sense impression
[as a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." Even a decedent's
description of what was said at a meeting with his insurance agent, made immediately after
the meeting ended, was admissible as a present sense impression under the federal rules.




in-court probing of the declarant.8 6 Reliance is placed on the single
factor of complete spontaneity, assured by carefully defined cir-
cumstantial requirements, which furnishes evidence of the declar-
ant's sincerity. In so doing, necessarily, there is always the obvious
danger of inaccurate perception or faulty memory.
Several states have adopted the broader present sense impres-
sion exception 87 by not requiring precise contemporaneity.88 The
trial judge in his or her discretion may exclude comments made too
long after an event to be reliable.8 This is because assertions made
after the event or condition that they describe or explain have less
indicia of reliability.
In Commonwealth v. Coleman, the court did not address the is-
sue of spontaneity. The declarant stated that her boyfriend, the
defendant, was exhibiting threatening behavior and that he
claimed he was going to kill her.' 0 However, from her statement it
is impossible to determine that spontaneity is actually present
from the events observed, rather than jocularity, irony, sarcasm,
self-interest or facetiousness on the part of the declarant that may
have spurred the utterance. 1 It is true that the swiftness with
which an utterance ensues, in and of itself, is insufficient as a guar-
antor of the declarant's veracity. But it is some assurance of trust-
worthiness. Therefore, some time frame must be established as to
the contemporaneity requirement. The Coleman court concluded
that the statement was spontaneous without stating what factors
led them to that conclusion and without giving guidelines for lower
courts to follow.'2
86. The swiftness with which an utterance ensues, in and of itself, is insufficient as a
guarantor of the declarant's veracity. Commentators cite psychological studies indicating
that the interval which separates cognition from the deception reaction is minute, often a
matter of fractions of seconds, and impossible to gauge without the aid of instruments.
Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 75, at 437; Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and
the Uniform Rules; A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REv. 204 (1960).
87. State v. Flesher, 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa 1979); J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, 803-77,
803-78 (1981 & Supp. 1982).
88. FED. R. EVID. 803(1) advisory committee notes; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
at 803-32, 803-33 (1979).
89. States such as Colorado, Kansas, New Jersey and Utah limit this exception to con-
temporaneous assertions, and Florida and Ohio give the trial judge discretion to exclude
such an assertion if the circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
90. 458 Pa. at 114, 326 A.2d at 389.
91. Foster, Present Sense Impression, An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 299, 331 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Foster].
92. The majority, while acknowledging the presence of excitement in the situation,
concluded that "the exception for excited utterances is not applicable to the present circum-
stances." 458 Pa. at 117, 326 A.2d at 389.
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In Commonwealth v. Robinson, s the Pennsylvania Superior
Court found that the statement of the witness did not describe a
present mental state or an event which she was witnessing as she
spoke. In that case, the mother was charged with criminal homi-
cide as the result of the death of her three-year-old caused by mal-
nutrition and dehydration. The trial court admitted statements
made by a five-year-old to her grandmother that her "mommy had
gone out." The child's response to questions was, "[No, my
mommy won't be back. She always leave [sic] me and my
brother."'" The superior court found that the declarant was
describing past actions and not an event which she was witnessing
as she spoke.' 5 The court further stated that "the spontaneity
which must be demonstrated is absent."' 6 The courts require that
the declaration be spoken contemporaneously with the event to
which it refers.' 7 Also, statements made at a later time or in refer-
ence to past events are considered the product of reflective mental
action,'" but the precise time frames or factors relating to reflective
thought have yet to be defined.
B. Perception
In many cases, spontaneous statements have been excluded for
lack of perception due to the requirement of the "res gestae" doc-
trine that the event perceived and described be the principal liti-
gated fact.9 The present sense impression exception, however, cov-
ers not only statements inspired by the main event in issue, but
also those describing contributing factors and circumstantially re-
lated events or conditions. Often there is no requirement that the
declarant be a participant in the event which is the subject of the
declaration. 100
93. 273 Pa. Super. 337, 417 A.2d 677 (1979).
94. Id. at 340, 417 A.2d at 680. The court could have found the statement not admissi-
ble based on the competency of the child witness.
95. Id. at 341, 417 A.2d at 681.
96. Id.
97. See Reichman v. Wallach, 306 Pa. Super. 177, 452 A.2d 501 (1982).
98. 452 A.2d at 510.
99. Shadowski v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 226 Pa. 537, 75 A. 730 (1910). "Res gestae state-
ments are admissible only when it appears from credible evidence other than the testimony
of the declarant himself that he actually observed the facts upon which he spoke." This case
was expressly overruled in Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 387 (1974).
See Carney v. Pa. R.R. Co., 438 Pa. 489, 240 A.2d 71 (1968). See also Swanson, The Law of
Res Gestae and Considerations of Perception, 49 INSURAN cE COUNSEL J. 381 (1982).
100. Ashby v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 356 Pa. 610, 52 A.2d 578 (1947). The drafters
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(1), specifically rejected participation as a re-
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The perception requirement is no more than the basic require-
ment of firsthand knowledge or specific competency in qualifying a
declarant to testify as to a condition or an event.10 1 As long as per-
ception is established, an observation need not be expressed orally
to qualify as a present sense impression, as, for instance, when a
bystander copies a license plate number during a robbery and gives
it to a police officer. 10 2 Unless perception is made clear, however,
the statement must be excluded. 03
The cases are divided on whether actual sight is required to es-
tablish perception. 0 4 Some cases hold that one who hears but does
not see cannot have a sufficient opportunity to observe, and that
any statement as to the occurrence is an opinion or conclusion
based on things not witnessed.'05 Although this viewpoint may well
be justified in some cases, there are many conceivable situations in
which aural perception would be sufficient to establish the occur-
rence of an event. Visual observation is a factor to be considered in
evaluating the validity of a statement; however, an absolute re-
quirement of visual perception would lead to the exclusion of some
evidence that may be more reliable than that currently admitted
quirement. They pointed out that "a non-participant may be moved to describe what he
perceives. ... See FED. R. EvW. 803(1) advisory committee's note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 304
(1972). See also Potter v. Baker, 162 Ohio St. 488, 124 N.E.2d 140 (1955) (statement of
bystander that motorist must have rushed light inadmissible when no evidence that state-
ment was made with reference to motorist who struck pedestrian).
101. A student comment advocates the incorporation of a requirement that the propo-
nent of a present sense impression adduce independent corroborative evidence "either direct
or circumstantial, that the declarant was in spatial and temporal proximity to the event he
described." Comment, The Present Sense Impression Hearsay Exception: An Analysis of
the Contemporaneity and Corroboration Requirements, 71 Nw. U.L. REv. 666, 674 (1976).
102. An intriguing question concerning the construction of the present sense impres-
sion exception is whether the declarant's physical perception actually must be communi-
cated to a listener in order to be admitted, or whether statements uttered within no one's
hearing, or written down for personal use, likewise qualify. This was answered to a certain
degree in Commonwealth v. Dugan, 252 Pa. Super. 377, 381 A.2d 967 (1977), where the
court held that a pictorial representation of defendant made by an artist fulfilled the re-
quirements of the "res gestae" exception to what otherwise would have been hearsay; thus
the sketch was properly admitted. What about a tape recording?
103. The declarant must have first-hand knowledge of that which his utterances en-
compass. Rule 602 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states the personal knowledge require-
ment: "A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to
support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter."
104. Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 278 A.2d 776 (1971), and Montesi v. State, 220
Tenn. 354, 417 S.W 2d 554 (1967).
105. In Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 278 A.2d 776 (1971), the court held state-
ments properly excluded where declarant did not see accident but only heard it, in a per-
sonal injury action arising out of alleged blowout of a tire recapped by the defendant. The
witness said from the sound it was like a shot or blowout of a tire.
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under other exceptions to the rule against hearsay.10 6
The importance of spontaneity has often been emphasized by
commentators and judges; but even where circumstances surround-
ing the statement imply spontaneity, the perceptual acuity of the
declarant and the perceptual bases for his observation still pose
problems.1 0 7 In fact, statements which fail to yield any guarantee
whatsoever as to the perceptual acuity of the declarant are poten-
tially more risky than those in which the primary flaw involves the
declarant's sincerity. Factors affecting sincerity, such as bias, mo-
tives borne of self-interest, or general disposition may be evident
to the finder of fact, or may be discovered by the adversary prior
to trial, and exposed as impeachment of the hearsay declarant.10
Any existing perceptual defects of the declarant remain virtually
impossible to detect and expose absent cross-examination, given
the complexity of factors which impact upon perceptual
processes.109
The subject of the declarant's perception, an "event or condi-
tion," covers an extensive range of circumstances indicative of the
potential breadth of this exception's utility.110 Much recent author-
ity acknowledges that the condition or event which is the subject
of comment need not be the event forming the subject matter of
litigation."" Often, proof of conditions existing or events occurring
before or after the disputed incident elucidates circumstances ex-
isting at the time of the event in question. The probity of state-
ments of present sense impression made prior or subsequent to the
main or litigated event is a question of relevance to be determined
by the trial judge.
Concern regarding perceptual acuity of witnesses not subject to
cross-examination is warranted, yet it must be recognized that lack
106. There is always the obvious danger of inaccurate perception or faulty memory,
just as the same risks are taken in the case of dying declarations.
107. Id. Personal experience and attitude can cause us to perceive what we expect to
perceive and not necessarily what actually occurred. Garner, The Perception and Memory
of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 391, 395 (1933); M. Ladd, The Hearsay We Admit, 5 OKLA.
L. REv. 271, 280 (1952).
108. FED R. Evm. 806.
109. Foster, supra, at 322.
110. Rule 803(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines a "present sense impression
[as a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant
was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately thereafter." FED. R. EvID. 803(1). Even
a decedent's description of what was said at a meeting with his insurance agent, made im-
mediately after the meeting ended, was admissible as a present sense impression under the
federal rules. Wolfson v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 455 F. Supp. 82 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
111. See supra aote 109 and accompanying text.
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of perceptual accuracy is a hearsay risk, one which hearsay excep-
tions are theoretically formulated to diminish but not eliminate.112
The way to ensure the hearsay declarant's perceptual acuity is to
reformulate the contours of the hearsay exceptions to take human
perceptual problems into account, rather than to utilize the per-
sonal knowledge requirement as a guise for excluding evidence
deemed undependable regardless of whether it qualifies under a
hearsay exception. 13
In Coleman, the victim's statement may not have been about
events she was presently observing but rather about her judgment
of future conduct of the defendant. There is a serious question as
to whether the statements in the case were made with personal
knowledge or whether they were the result of memory and reflec-
tion on the part of the declarant. It is true that present sense im-
pressions cover not only statements inspired by the main event in
issue, but also those describing contributing factors and circum-
stantially related events or conditions." 4 But it is possible that all
the statements of the victim were not based upon conditions and
events being currently perceived.
In Commonwealth v. Robinson,"' the court excluded the state-
ments made over the telephone of a child stating that "mommy
had gone out." When asked if her mother would return soon, the
child's additional statement excluded was: "[N]o, my mommy
won't be back. She always leave [sic] me and my brother."1 6 The
court held that the statements did not describe an event which the
child was witnessing as she spoke; rather, they described past ac-
tions of her mother." 7 Could not these same statements apply to
Coleman when the defendant said that "he's going to kill me"?
How does the statement explain a condition or event made while
declarant was observing it? The courts should discuss in detail the
requirements necessary for firsthand knowledge and not just con-
clude that perception is or is not present.
112. Foster, supra, at 310.
113. Id. at 311.
114. Shadowski v. Pittsburgh Ry. Co., 226 Pa. 537, 75 A. 730 (1919) (declarant's state-
ment that the motor was about to hit the child would be admissible under present sense
impression exception.). See supra note 10.
115. 273 Pa. Super. 337, 417 A.2d 67 (1979).
116. Id. at 340, 417 A.2d at 678.
117. Id. at 341, 417 A.2d at 679.
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C. The Opinion Rule
To be admitted as a present sense impression, the statement
made while perceiving an event or condition, or immediately there-
after, must also describe or explain the event or condition per-
ceived." 8 Most statements received under this exception will sim-
ply assert the existence of the condition or the occurrence of the
event, and the term "describe" accurately captures the function of
such statements. Some, however, interpret, assess or evaluate mat-
ters perceived, and these are clearly reached by the term "ex-
plain." 11 9 The question arises as to whether the opinion evidence
rule places qualifications or restrictions on evidence otherwise ad-
missible as a present sense impression.110 Because it is necessary to
achieve some substantial degree of specificity in spelling out the
requisites of evidence admitted under the present sense impression
exception, the opinion evidence rule must be considered. Professor
McCormick concedes that most courts have limited the admissibil-
ity of this kind of evidence by an application of the opinion evi-
dence rule.1
2'
Some courts have excluded otherwise admissible evidence on the
basis of the opinion evidence rule. 22 The modern trend is to view
the "opinion rule" as a "rule of preference, ' 123 such that if, for ex-
ample, specificity is possible, it is preferred to less descriptive con-
clusions. Where specificity is not possible, more conclusory state-
ments will be allowed so long as they promise to aid the trier of
fact.12 4 Thus, opinions in out-of-court declarations may be received
in circumstances where the opinions of testifying witnesses would
not be allowed. This is because the testifying witness can usually
describe the more concrete facts that underlie his opinion. An out-
of-court statement cannot be rephrased, so a court must choose
118. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1).
119. 4 LoUISELL AND MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 438, at 491 (1980).
120. Witnesses who are not experts cannot ordinarily give opinions; they may only
relate facts. Originally the doctrine barring opinion testimony was confined to testimony not
based on the witness' personal knowledge. Witnesses are to give the "facts" and not conclu-
sions drawn from the facts or opinions about the facts.
121. MCCORMICK § 11, at 28. He would admit the evidence in that the rule often ig-
nores the way people naturally talk. § 297, at 858.
122. See Clements v. Peyton, 398 S.W.2d 477 (Ky. 1966); Walsh v. Table Rock
Asphalt Constr. Co., 522 S.W.2d 116 (Mo. App. 1975); Johnston v. Ohis, 76 Wash. 2d 398,
457 P.2d 194 (1969).
123. See Comment, The Opinion Rule as a Rule of Preference: Application to Extra-
judicial Declarations, 42 Mo. L. REV. 409 (1977).
124. J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1918, at 1014 (3d ed. 1940).
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between receiving the opinion or doing without whatever the de-
clarant has to offer. It is important that courts not apply this rule
mechanically so as to exclude valuable evidence.
Clearly, a legitimate reason exists to admit opinions of lay wit-
nesses to clarify the witness' testimony to the factfinder. This will
often serve to round out the story and "to lend verisimilitude to an
otherwise bald and unconvincing narrative."'12 This was the view
taken by the court in Houston Oxygen, for the statement by Sally
Cooper that "we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked
if they kept that rate of speed up" is not a statement of fact, but
one of opinion. 126 The statement was admitted since it "was allud-
ing to an occurrence within her own knowledge in language calcu-
lated to make her 'meaning clearer to the jury'. .. .
Even where witnesses, whether experts or nonexperts, are per-
mitted to give opinions, some jurisdictions follow the common law
rule that opinions are not allowed on ultimate issues. 2 8 This ap-
proach is more or less restrictive depending on what the court
views as an ultimate issue. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 abandons
any restrictions on testimony on the ultimate issue in a case.
129
Courts must evaluate evidence that is in the nature of an opin-
ion not only under the opinion evidence rule, but also using the
rules relating to relevancy.3 0 In evaluating probative value under
these rules, the judge in such situations weighs the prejudicial ef-
fects of such statements in the form of an opinion against proba-
tive worth to the jury. In criminal cases, greater scrutiny is re-
quired. There, the judge must also view the evidence in relation to
the constitutional protections afforded criminal defendants.
Often, declarations of present sense impressions are inextricably
bound up in evaluative judgments which involve elements of past
memory or belief. This was true in the Coleman case in that the
victim-declarant could have been describing present events or con-
125. Comment, 21 TEx. L. REv. 298, 307 (1943) as it relates to the term "res gestae."
126. Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 3, 161 S.W.2d 474, 476 (1942).
127. 139 Tex. at 7, 161 S.W.2d at 477.
128. The common law purported to apply a rule which prohibited testimony in opin-
ion form on the "ultimate issue" in the case. The rationale was that to permit such testi-
mony "usurped" the province of the jury, 7 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1920, at 18, a ground
which Professor Wigmore characterized as "empty rhetoric."
129. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in Lewis v. Mellor, 259 Pa. Super. 509, 393
A.2d 941 (1978), refused to follow prior cases on the "ultimate issue" rule in the
State-including Supreme Court of Pennsylvania cases-and expressly adopted FE. R.
EVID. 704 as Pennsylvania law.
130. See FED. R. EvID. 401-03.
1986
Duquesne Law Review
ditions, or on the other hand, she could have been giving her opin-
ion as to future conduct of the defendant by relying on his past
action or conduct. Often, there is no clear line between a "fact"
and an "opinion,"'' but a witness who states that "he's going to
kill me" does not seem to be stating facts.1
3 2
Pennsylvania courts have not explained how the opinion evi-
dence rule relates to present sense impressions. The supreme court
has stated that an admission containing a conclusion or opinion
will be excluded on the basis of the opinion evidence rule since the
opinion evidence rule which excludes the opinion of third-party
witnesses applies with equal force to an adverse party.133 One could
conclude that the rule should apply with equal force to statements
contained in declarations of present sense impressions.
The trial court has considerable discretion in ruling upon
whether testimony is "fact" or "opinion" testimony, and if "opin-
ion," whether it should be admitted or excluded. The superior
court has held that this latitude is particularly appropriate to a
ruling on the admissibility of an excited utterance, for someone
who is excited is especially likely to speak in conclusory terms."3
In such a case the opinion rule should be applied sparingly, if at
all.' "5 The question arises as to whether the same rule should apply
in cases of present sense impression whereby opinion evidence is
freely admitted. The Pennsylvania cases have not clearly ad-
dressed this issue.
D. The Corroboration Requirement
As with most hearsay exceptions, few problems arise when the
out-of-court declarant offers his or her own testimony. In cases
where the declarant can be cross-examined as to the statement,
any defects in the witness' memory, narration, perception and
131. See Lewis v. Mellor, 259 Pa. Super. 509, 393 A.2d 941 (1978) (collecting authori-
ties); MCCORMICK, at 26-32.
132. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 458 Pa. 112, 326 A.2d 287 (1974).
133. Starner v. Wirth, 440 Pa. 177, 269 A.2d 674 (1971).
134. Commonwealth v. Galloway, 336 Pa. Super. 225, 485 A.2d 776 (1984).
135. Id., quoting from MCCORMICK, at 858 (2d ed. 1972) and Advisory Committee's
Notes which state that "[p]ermissible 'subject matter' of the statement is limited under
Exception [803] (1) to description or explanation of the event or condition, the assumption
being that spontaneity, in the absence of a startling event, may extend no farther." Id.
"Someone who is excited, is especially likely to speak in conclusory terms. In such a case,
therefore, the opinion rule 'should be applied sparingly, if at all. .. ' McCormick, supra, at
858." 485 A.2d at 781.
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sincerity should be revealed. 36 Given the opportunity for cross-ex-
amination, the prior statement made by the testifying witness may
be more trustworthy than any attempt at trial to elicit recollection
of the event or condition. From the viewpoint of the declarant's
memory, the extrajudicial statement can be said to be more relia-
ble than trial testimony."'7 Problems arise in cases where the out-
of-court statement is being repeated by an in-court auditor. Origi-
nally, there was a requirement of corroboration by the in-court
auditor.
Both Thayer and Morgan can be read as supporting a require-
ment that the in-court witness have observed the event that is the
subject of the declarant's statement.138 They emphasize that the
witness will probably have perceived the event and would be sub-
ject to cross-examination concerning the circumstances surround-
ing the declarant's statement."'9 In most cases, the auditor-witness
will probably have perceived the event. But since this is a non-
startling event, the auditor-witness may very well have had his or
her attention directed elsewhere. In instances in which the testify-
ing witness was in a position to observe the event or condition but
failed to do so, there is a greater likelihood that the out-of-court
declarant's statement will be sincere. The mere presence of an-
other person reduces the possibility that a falsehood will go unrec-
ognized, and thus checks the potential for fabrication.1 40 In any
case, the statement itself cannot be relied upon for its own
accuracy." '1
As a practical matter, the testifying witness will often be in a
position to corroborate the declarant's statement if the declaration
is truly contemporaneous with the event or condition. This prag-
matic reasoning, however, fails to consider either electronic com-
munications between declarant and witness or statements that are
136. Professor Morgan includes all the reasons expressed for the exclusion of hearsay
"Hearsay is excluded because of potential infirmities with respect to the observation, mem-
ory, narration and veracity of him who utters the offered words when not under oath and
subject to cross-examination." Morgan, The Law of Evidence, 1941-1945, 59 HARv. L. REv.
481, 541 (1946).
137. Comment, Hearsay Under the Proposed Federal Rules: A Discretionary Ap-
proach, 15 wAYNE L. REv. 1079, 1119 (1969).
138. E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 341 (1962); Thayer, 15 AM L. Rev. 71,
1116 (1881).
139. Id.
140. Comment, The Present Sense Impression, 56 Tax. L. REv. 1053 (1978).
141. Evidence of personal knowledge must be supplied, with the proponent of the dec-
laration having the burden of proof. Williamson v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 244 Pa. Super.
492, 496, 368 A.2d 1292, 1296 (1976).
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made soon enough after the event or condition to satisfy the "sub-
stantial contemporaneity" requirement. 4"
Professor Waltz poses the following hypothetical in which "[t]he
witness testifies that she walks into the living room and her hus-
band says, 'Clyde Bushmat, whose voice I'd recognize anywhere,
called me on the telephone just seconds ago and offered me a
bribe.' ,143 Professor Waltz argues that although this statement
would appear to be admissible under rule 803(1) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, there is no guarantee that the husband received
the phone call, that the voice was that of Bushmat and that
Bushmat in fact made a bribe offer. Therefore, Waltz concludes,
the absence of corroboration of the described occurrence by the
witness to the declaration should bar its admissibility.
4
4
It has been recommended that in those instances in which the
declarant is unavailable and the testifying witness had no opportu-
nity to corroborate, the out-of-court declaration should be admissi-
ble if it comports with the substantial contemporaneity require-
ment. 45 This was the position taken by the Iowa courts in a
murder case involving a telephone sense impression which tended
to incriminate the accused. In State v. Flesher, ' 6 the victim's hus-
band had been talking on the telephone with his wife when, over
the telephone, he heard a knock at her door. The wife went off the
line briefly and the witness heard conversation in the background.
His wife then came back on the line and said, "It's Joan." (The
accused's first name was Joan; she was the witness' lover and had
made an otherwise uncorroborated "I did it" statement.)." 7
The Iowa Supreme Court, in approving receipt of the telephone
testimony as the narration of a present sense impression under the
federal model, specifically addressed the requirement of corrobora-
tion. The court stated that the presence or absence of direct cor-
roboration will affect the weight given the declaration, but found
nothing "in either the wording of the exception or [sic] in its un-
derlying rationale which requires corroboration as a condition of
142. For a modern commentator who unambiguously advocates the corroboration re-
quirement, see Waltz, Present Sense Impression and the Residual Exceptions: A New Day
for "Great" Hearsay, 2 LMGATION 22, 22-24 (1975).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Comment, The Present Sense Impression, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1053, 1073 (1978). Sit-
uations of this type arise when the testifying witness heard the declaration through an elec-
tronic medium as in the case of a telephone conversation or the listening to a recorded tape.
146. 286 N.W.2d 215 (Iowa App. 1979).
147. Id. at 219.
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its admissibility." 4"
Courts have not insisted on actual corroboration or the opportu-
nity of corroboration by the testifying witness of the event or con-
dition described in a present sense impression statement. Uncriti-
cal application of the corroboration requirement could well lead to
inconsistent and improper results." 9 The corroboration require-
ment should not be discarded, but clear guidelines as to its re-
quirements must be developed. If courts reject the corroboration
requirement, they disregard the teaching of the evidence scholar
whose perception gave birth to the present sense impression
exception. 5 '
In Coleman, the declarant was unavailable and the testifying
witness was separated from the event by a network of telephone
lines. She was not in a position to visually corroborate the occur-
rence. Some cases have held that one who hears but does not see
cannot have a sufficient opportunity to observe, and that any state-
ment as to the occurrence is an opinion or conclusion based on
things not witnessed. 15' Although this viewpoint may well be justi-
fied in some cases, there are many situations in which aural per-
ception would be sufficient to verify the occurrence of an event. In
fact, verification was the exact word used by the Coleman court.
5 2
However, the court in Coleman did not explain which elements are
necessary for verification, versus which elements are necessary for
corroboration.
In Commonwealth v. Blackwell,' s5 the Superior Court of Penn-
sylvania took a different view than that in Coleman. The court re-
148. Id. at 218. The court used Commonwealth v. Coleman as authority.
149. Comment, The Present Sense Impression, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1053, 1074 (1978). A
case that proves this point is Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). In
Myre the complaining witness stated that she had a person follow the robber while she
phoned the authorities. The person gave her the license plate number of the alleged robber
that led to the defendant's arrest. She was permitted to relate these facts to the jury includ-
ing the license plate number. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the statement
of the license plate number was inadmissible hearsay; the statement of the license plate
number was not a present sense impression declaration "because the witness did not have
an equal opportunity to observe and check a possible misstatement. 545 S.W.2d at
827.
150. Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay:
Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REv. 869, 898 (1981). "Again and again Thayer and those
who followed him alluded to the availability of corroboration as a significantly reassuring
aspect of the present sense impression's support structure." Id. at 897.
151. See, e.g., Johnson v. Newell, 160 Conn. 269, 278 A.2d 776 (1971); Montesi v.
State, 220 Tenn. 354, 417 S.W.2d 554 (1967).
152. 458 Pa. at 119, 326 A.2d at 390.
153. 343 Pa. Super. 201, 494 A.2d 426 (1985).
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quired a visual corroboration standard, stating that "[t]his excep-
tion requires that the declarant see the event and make an
observation about it to another person also present at the
scene .. ."154 The court seems to be establishing a rigid standard
which will exclude valuable evidence from the factfinder. Such a
standard may be most appropriate in criminal cases, but civil cases
may well satisfy the reliability requirement with less than visual
corroboration.
The court also stated that "[clases involving the present sense
impression exception to the hearsay rule are infrequent."I55 Yet,
present sense impressions are all around us and used daily in our
lives. The reason that cases involving present sense impression are
infrequent is that the courts of the Commonwealth have not estab-
lished clear guidelines and analyses for lawyers and judges to make
appropriate use of the exception.
VI. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND PRESENT SENSE
IMPRESSIONS
A great many of the spontaneous statement decisions have re-
volved around out-of-court identifications by victims of attack.15"
This may be the reason for the present day controversy, namely,
whether out-of-court acts, including statements, of identification
properly should be treated as original 57 or hearsay evidence. 58 An
additional problem arises in that this evidence may violate the
confrontation clause of the United States Constitution,5 9 and sim-
154. 494 A.2d at 431.
155. Id.
156. Manetta, The Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements in Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 1984 CraM. L.J. 69, 99-100.
157. See FED. R. EVID. 801.
158. Hearsay statements are frequently described as "out-of-court" or "extrajudicial"
statements.
159. The complexity of reconciling the confrontation clause and the hearsay rules has
triggered an outpouring of scholarly commentary. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66-68 n.9
(1980), gives a complete discussion of this topic:
The complexity of reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules has
triggered an outpouring of scholarly commentary. Few observers have commented
without proposing, roughly or in detail, a basic approach. Some have advanced theo-
ries that would shift the general mode of analysis in favor of the criminal defendant.
See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 105 (1951); Seidelson, Hearsay Exceptions
and the Sixth Amendment, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 76, 91-92 (1971) (all hearsay
should be excluded except, perhaps, when prosecution shows absolute necessity, high
degree of trustworthiness, and "total absence" of motive to falsify); The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63, 237 (1968); Note, 31 VAND. L. REV. 682, 694
(1978).
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ilar provisions under the state constitution.' °
Although the trend in the law of evidence is toward greater ad-
missibility of hearsay, the sixth amendment confrontation clause
presents a countervailing consideration in the criminal law.' eM The
language is rather opaque, but read literally, the clause imposes an
absolute bar against the presentation of testimony by an out-of-
court witness against a criminal defendant. 62 The United States
Others have advanced theories that would relax constitutional restrictions on the use
of hearsay by the prosecutor. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, p. 159 (J.
Chadbourn rev. 1974); Note, The Confrontation Test for Hearsay Exceptions: An
Uncertain Standard, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 580, 594 (1971) ("fixed procedural definition of
the confrontation clause makes the actual protection afforded depend upon the par-
ticular evidence rules in force in each state"); Younger. Confrontation and Hearsay:
A Look Backward, A Peek Forward, 1 HOFSTRA L. REV. 32 (1973); Westen, The Fu-
ture of Confrontation, 7 MICH. L. REV. 1185 (1979); Graham, The Confrontation
Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful Witness, 56 TEx. L. REV. 151 (1978);
Note, 75 YALE L.J. 1434 (1966). See California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 172-89,90 S. Ct.
at 1942-51, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489 (Harlan, J., concurring) (Confrontation Clause requires
only that prosecution produce available witnesses; Due Process Clause bars convic-
tion "where the critical issues at trial were supported only by ex parte testimony not
subjected to cross-examination, and not found to be reliable by the trial judge." Id. at
186 n.20, 90 S. Ct. at 1949, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489.).
Still others have proposed theories that might either help or hurt the accused. See
Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 CalM. L. BULL. 99, 129 (1972); Baker, The Right to Confronta-
tion, the Hearsay Rules, and Due Process, 6 CONN L. REv. 529 (1974); Comment, 13
UCLA L. REV. 366, 376-377 (1966) (advocating sliding-scale "probative value-need
quotient"); Comment, 52 TEx. L. REV. 1167, 1190-91 (1974).
Finally, a number of commentators, while sometimes criticizing particular results or
language in past decisions, have generally agreed with the Court's present approach.
See Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-Conspirator Exception in
Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1405 (1972);
Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 48 (1972)
("the traditional approach ...with its recognition of a core constitutional value to
be preserved, but with its reluctance to make sweeping declarations as to the meaning
of that right ... is the best. . . compromise"); Note, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 748, and
n.38 (1965) (requiring "adequate substitute for confrontation," while recognizing that
no substitute can be "fully adequate"). See also Natali, Green, Dutton and Cham-
bers: Three Cases in Search of a Theory, 7 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 43, 62 (1975); The Su-
preme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAav. L. REV. 3, 199 (1971).
See also Kirkpatrick, Confrontation and Hearsay: Exemptions from the Constitutional
Unavailability Requirement, 70 MINN. L. REv. 665 (1986); McCoRMICK § 252, at 749 (3d
ed.).
160. PA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
161. See McCoRMICK § 252, at 749. For theoretical studies of the right of confronta-
tion, see 5 WIoMOax §§ 1395-1400; Baker, The Right of Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules,
and Due Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used in Criminal
Trials, 6 CONN. L. REV. 529 (1974); Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay
Rules: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRiM. L. BULL. 99 (1972).
162. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides in part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him [and] to
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Supreme Court, however, although addressing the confrontation
clause infrequently until 1965,' 63 has repeatedly refused to inter-
pret the confrontation clause literally to exclude all hearsay.164 The
modern era of confrontation clause analysis began with Pointer v.
Texas, 65 a case in which the Supreme Court held the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation to be a "fundamental right," applica-
ble to the states under the fourteenth amendment.' There are
few subjects upon which the courts of this nation have been more
nearly unanimous than in the belief that the right of confrontation
and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental require-
ment for the kind of fair trial that is this country's constitutional
goal. 16
7
Ohio v. Roberts'68 represents the Supreme Court's most recent
pronouncement on the confrontation clause. The defendant in
Roberts was charged with forgery of a check drawn in the name of
another and with possession of stolen credit cards belonging to the
drawee and his wife. 69 During a preliminary hearing, the drawee's
daughter testified at the behest of defense counsel that she was
acquainted with the defendant and that she assented to the de-
fendant's use of her apartment for a few days while she was away.
Lengthy questioning, however, failed to elicit an admission by the
witness that she had given the defendant checks and credit cards
without informing him that she did not have her parents' permis-
sion to use them.
70
At the trial before a jury, Roberts testified that the drawee's
daughter had given him the checks and credit cards with the un-
derstanding that he was permitted to use them.17 1 In rebuttal, the
prosecutor offered the transcript of the drawee's daughter's prelim-
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor ...."
163. The infrequency of confrontation clause decisions prior to 1965 is commonly ex-
plained by the inapplicability of the clause to the states prior to that date and the Supreme
Court's control over rules-of hearsay for the federal courts. See FED R. EvID. Art. VIII Intro-
ductory Note: The Hearsay Problem.
164. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (prior-recorded testimony ad-
mitted where state's witness unavailable); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (out-of-court
statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant its admission); California v. Green,
399 U.S. 149 (1970) (preliminary hearing testimony held admissible even in absence of op-
portunity for full cross-examination at trial).
165. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
166. Id. at 403.
167. Id. at 425.
168. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
169. Id. at 58.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 59.
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inary hearing testimony. Defense counsel objected that use of the
transcript violated the defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
frontation. After concluding that the witness was unavailable,'172
the trial court admitted the transcript into evidence and the jury
convicted Roberts on all counts.'
73
Justice White, writing for a six-member majority,upheld the ad-
mission of the transcript, ruling that the confrontation clause had
not been violated. 174 Candidly observing that the Court's previous
decisions in this regard had not stated an integrated theory of the
relationship of confrontation to hearsay,17 5 Justice White set forth
the general analytical principles to be applied to any confrontation
issue:
The Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the
range of admissible hearsay. First, in conformance with the Framers' prefer-
ence for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of
necessity. In the usual cases (including cases where prior cross-examination
has occurred) the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the un-
availability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the
defendant.
The second aspect operates once a witness is shown to be unavailable. Re-
flecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding pro-
cess by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence,
the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness
that "there is no material departure from the reason for the general rule"
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is un-
available. Even then his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate
"indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness.
176
Most commentators agree that the Supreme Court has presented
no clear and comprehensive theory of the confrontation clause
upon which lower courts can rely for guidance. 17 7 However, a read-
172. See infra notes 181-93 and accompanying text.
173. 448 U.S. at 60 (The Supreme Court of Ohio, by a 4-3 vote, held that the tran-
script was inadmissible.).
174. Id. at 77.
175. "The Court has not sought to map out a theory of the Confrontation Clause that
would determine the validity of all ... hearsay 'exceptions.' California v. Green. .. But a
general approach to the problem is discernible." Id. at 64, 65.
176. Id. at 65-66.
177. D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 418, at 133 (1980); Note, Evi-
dence-Constitutional Law, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 710 (1982).
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ing of Roberts shows a two-part test for determining the admissi-
bility of extrajudicial statements over a confrontation clause objec-
tion. The test first requires the prosecution to demonstrate that
the hearsay declarant is unavailable to testify at trial and thus can-
not be subjected to cross-examination.17 8 Once found unavailable,
the second part of the test requires a demonstration that the prior
testimony bore sufficient "indicia of reliability"' 79 to merit admis-
sibility. Such reliability, according to the Court, can be "inferred
without more" where a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" is in-
volved. 180 Where such a "firmly rooted" exception is not involved,
"particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" must be shown.'81
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, the availability of the de-
clarant is immaterial. However, in light of the confrontation clause,
in criminal cases the declarant must be shown to be unavailable
when extrajudicial statements are introduced against the ac-
cused. 182 Although most Pennsylvania decisions have involved
cases where the declarant was the victim in a homicide case, the
courts have not clearly defined the need for finding that the declar-
ant is unavailable, thereby meeting the requirements of the con-
frontation clause.
Also, the courts have not clearly established the "indicia of relia-
bility" as they relate to present sense impressions. On the question
of trustworthiness or reliability of declarations, a court must rule
on what corroborating circumstantial evidence is sufficient to make
the statement admissible. The trustworthiness of a statement must
be based on more than corroborating facts contained in the state-
ment being offered into evidence, a requirement now of most
courts.
Clearly, the courts cannot permit hearsay law to define the right
to confrontation. In criminal cases involving such an important
right as confrontation, insistence upon reliable evidence as the ba-
sis of adjudication is of the highest priority. Therefore, the present
178. 448 U.S. at 65. This has not been a problem with any of the criminal cases ap-
pealed in Pennsylvania. The cases have involved the statement of victims in homicide cases.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 66. Although there was no discussion of which exceptions are considered
"firmly rooted," the Court, in a footnote, listed as examples the dying declaration, cross-
examined pre-trial testimony, and business and public records. Id. at 66 n.8.
181. Id. at 66.
182. M. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and the Forgetful
Witness, 56 TEx. L. REv. 151, 195, would find the nonappearing but available hearsay de-
clarant violating the confrontation clause "only if the circumstances surrounding the making
of the declaration indicate that it was accusatory in nature when made."
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sense impression must be defined in light of the confrontation
clause.
VII. GUIDELINES FOR ADMISSIBILITY
A. The Availability Requirement
The Supreme Court has not given courts complete guidelines as
to the admission of hearsay in compliance with the confrontation
clause. But it has in Roberts given a two-prong test, the first prong
of which requires that the declarant be unavailable. 83 Therefore,
prior to the admission of present sense impressions, courts must
decide the status of the declarant in light of the requirement that
the declarant be unavailable. When considering the admission of
hearsay evidence in a criminal trial, a court must look at both the
availability of the declarant to testify at trial and the impact of the
evidence against the accused. 10 4 If the declaration is not an integral
part of the government's case, in that it is not to be used against
the defendant, it may not be violative of constitutional rights.
Pennsylvania cases have not considered the availability of the
out-of-court declarant in their discussions as to the admission of
"res gestae" and present sense impression hearsay evidence. In
most criminal cases reviewed by the appellate courts, the state-
ments involved were made by victims of homicide; thus, the issue
as to availability was moot. Still, lower courts are in need of guide-
lines when faced with confrontation clause issues challenging pre-
sent sense impresssions sought to be introduced against the ac-
cused. Trial judges must have a clear understanding as to the
circumstances that excuse cross-examination due to the absence of
the witness at trial.1s5
A criminal defendant must be given an opportunity to put on a
defense. The confrontation clause secures this right by giving the
defendant notice of the evidence against him by requiring his pres-
183. 448 U.S. at 66.
184. Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 128, 138-40 (1972); one commentator advocates a
modification of Rule 801(1) to require either the declarant's availability for cross-examina-
tion concerning the statement or testimony by one who heard the statement and had a
similar opportunity to observe the event or condition. Foster, Present Sense Impressions:
An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 334 (1979). People v. Dement, 661
P.2d 675, 680-82 (Colo. 1983) (unavailability must be shown when evidence is sought to be
admitted under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule).
185. See Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules and Due Process-A




ence at trial and opportunity to attack this evidence by requiring
the state to: (1) produce witnesses in person; (2) call those wit-
nesses and attempt to elicit their evidence directly; and (3) permit
the defendant to cross-examine them. 186 The confrontation clause
functions as a preference rule. The state must produce available
witnesses, call them and attempt to elicit testimony from them.
187
If a witness is unavailable, then the state, subject to the substan-
tive standards of the due process clause, can present its evidence
without the witness.
88
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) provides a convenient list of the
generally recognized unavailability situations. It provides as
follows:
(a) Definition of Unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situa-
tions in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testi-
fying concerning the subject matter of his statement; or(2) persists in refus-
ing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an or-
der of the court to do so; or(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject
matter of his statement; or(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the
hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infir-
mity; or (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his attendance ... by process or other reasona-
ble means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory,inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of his statement for the purpose of preventing the wit-
ness from attending or testifying. 18
A direct constitutional clash is avoided by the introductory word-
ing of Federal Rule of Evidence 803, which does not state that evi-
dence satisfying an exception listed therein is admissible, but
merely that it is "not excluded by the hearsay rule." The Advisory
Committee's note to article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence
states:
In recognition of the separateness of the confrontation clause and the hear-
say rule, and to avoid inviting collisions between them or between the hear-
186. Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence
for Criminal Cases, 91 HAsv. L. REv. 567 (1978).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. The corresponding revised Uniform Rule (1974) is to the same effect. It should be
noted that FED. R. EVID. 804(1) does not purport to be an exhaustive listing of the grounds
of evidentiary unavailability. If a court bases a finding of unavailability on an unlisted
ground, such as the age of the potential witness, a separate constitutional analysis of the
sufficiency of the grounds will be required.
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say rule and other exclusionary principles, the exceptions set forth in Rules
803 and 804 are stated in terms of exemption from the general exclusionary
mandate of the hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of
admissibility.190
Availability is also important in civil cases, even though it is not
constitutionally mandated. If the declarant is available and the re-
porter had no opportunity to observe the event or condition de-
scribed, the out-of-court declarant should not be excluded. This is
in accord with one of the basic precepts of evidence law-the
"best" most reliable evidence should be presented to assist the
factfinder191 In addition, the calling of the available declarant will
lessen the risk of opinion evidence and statements not based upon
personal knowledge being accepted by the factfinder. Not only will
cross-examination provide an opportunity to discover lack of per-
sonal knowledge, but it will also permit the testing of narration, as
well as the witness' memory and sincerity.192
Closely associated with unavailability is the identification of the
maker of the present sense impression statement. Because of the
fear that the personal knowledge requirement may not be present,
some courts exclude a present sense impression declaration made
by an unidentified bystander or phantom witness.1 93 Exclusion is
properly justified by a suspicion that the dangers of fabrication on
the part of either declarant or witness outweigh circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness; the possibility that the personal
knowledge requirement has been met is simply too remote. Never-
theless, the testifying witness need not be able to identify the de-
clarant by name. 1 4 The rule requires only that the witness be able
to testify about some external indicia of the declarant's personal
knowledge or that the nature of the declarant's statement itself in-
dicates personal knowledge. There, the proponent of the declara-
tion must supply evidence of personal knowledge. 115
Pennsylvania courts should make a clear distinction between
civil and criminal cases and the requirements of availability of the
declarant in present sense impression situations. Present sense im-
pressions can provide valuable evidence to the factfinder and
190. FED. R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee note.
191. Comment, The Present Sense Impression, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1053, 1071 (1978).
192. McCORMICK says that "cross-examination [is] an essential safeguard of the accu-
racy and completeness of testimony .... " McCORMICK § 19, at 47.
193. Comment, The Present Sense Impression, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1053, 1063 (1978).
194. Id.




should be admitted in most cases where the declarant is available
in civil actions. This is because constitutional restrictions will not
bar the evidence and opposing counsel can be afforded an opportu-
nity to cross-examine by procuring a subpeona and requiring the
declarant to testify. On the other hand, in criminal cases, courts
should be required to hold a brief hearing to determine if the prof-
fered hearsay testimony comports with the requirements of the
confrontation clause as to the declarant's unavailability.
B. The Corroboration Requirement
Commentators have disagreed about whether Rule 803(1) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence retains the common-law corroboration
requirements."" The absence of a corroboration requirement in the
wording of Rule 803(1) would imply a departure from the common-
law exception. But a reading of the accompanying Advisory Com-
mittee's Note implies retention of the common-law corroboration
condition. 197 The fundamental concern underlying the corrobora-
tion issue is that, in the absence of corroborative evidence, there is
no assurance that the event occurred. The Supreme Court in Rob-
erts has indicated that corroboration is important in order to with-
stand a constitutional challenge. The second prong of the court's
two-prong test stated that the "statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate 'indicia of reliability'."1 98 To determine if the state-
ment is reliable, the court said it is reliable only when it "falls
within a firmly rooted hearsay exception" or when there exists a
"showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. '"199 Since
the present sense impression is a relatively new exception, for its
acceptance there must be evidence to show a guarantee of
trustworthiness.
2 0 0
196. For differing interpretations of the corroboration issue under Rule 803(1), see
Foster, Present Sense Impression: An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299,
305-06, 344 (1979); Waltz, Present Sense Impressions and the Residual Exception: A New
Day for Great Hearsay?, 2 LITIGATION 22 (1975); Comment, The Present Sense Impression,
56 TEx. L. REV. 1053, 1068-69 (1978); Comment, The Present Sense Impression Hearsay
Exception: An Analysis of the Contemporaneity and Corroboration Requirements, 71 Nw.
U.L. REV. 666, 673-76 (1976).
197. The Note states that Rule 803 is a synthesis of the common-law hearsay excep-
tions with revisions reflecting modern developments, which suggests that a departure from
the common-law requirement of corroboration for admissibility of present sense impressions
was not intended. Comment, The Need for a New Approach to the Present Sense Impres-
sion Hearsay Exception After State v. Flesher, 67 IowA L. REV. 179, 185 (1981).
198. 448 U.S. at 66.
199. Id.
200. Historically, corroboration is required. See supra notes 135-54 and accompanying
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In Coleman, the declarant was unavailable and the testifying
witness was separated from the event by a network of telephone
lines. The court stated that the inability of the mother to observe
the situation did not preclude application of the exception, and
that verification was not a prerequisite to the statement's admissi-
bility.20' The mother was not in a position to corroborate the oc-
currence. There were, however, two pieces of evidence in Coleman
that corroborated the defendant's violent behavior: the mother's
testimony that as the declarant was referring to the defendant's
conduct, the mother could hear the defendant shouting in the
background, and the defendant's testimony that he and the declar-
ant had engaged in a loud argument immediately prior to the
phone call.202 The court specifically noted that it relied on the cor-
roborative testimony of the defendant in its decision to uphold the
admission of the hearsay statement.20 3 The court's reference to the
mother's corroborative testimony suggests that this evidence also
was considered to be important. 04
The court's statement that "verification was not a prerequisite"
for the admission of the hearsay statement suggests that verifica-
tion and corroboration were intended to have different connota-
tions in the opinion.0 5 The Coleman decision, then, cannot be un-
derstood to dismiss the need for any corroborative evidence of the
hearsay statement. The court's distinction between verification and
corroboration is plausible, since verification implies a stricter de-
gree of certainty regarding the facts of the event. There are many
situations in which aural perception would be sufficient to estab-
lish the occurrence of an event.
In Commonwealth v. Blackwell,06 the Superior Court of Penn-
text.
201. 458 Pa. at 119, 326 A.2d at 390.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. In Commonwealth v. Coleman, the court stated that the mother was able to
hear shouting in the background, so that there was at least some corroboration of the accu-
racy of her daughter's description of what was happening. Id.
205. This distinction is suggested in the following passage from the opinion:
[W]e do not consider the inability of the mother to have observed the situation in the
apartment to be sufficiently persuasive in effect to disallow application of the excep-
tion. Verification has never been deemed an absolute prerequisite to admissibility of
testimony under the Court's previous treatment of res gestae exceptions to the hear-
say rule. In view of the facts and corroborative testimony of the appellant, we can see
no reason to alter that practice in this case.
Id.
206. 343 Pa. Super. 201, 494 A.2d 426 (1985).
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sylvania held that a hearsay statement was not admissible because
the statement was not made in the presence of another person who
was also at the scene.2 °7 In Blackwell, the victim described events
over the telephone to a police dispatcher as to his abduction, rob-
bery, and abandonment in a park. The court took a strict construc-
tion approach to the corroboration requirement and held that the
statement was not admissible due to lack of corroboration. But the
statement may have been verified even though not corroborated.
There was information from the police and medical evidence that
the declarant was abducted and abandoned in a park, which
caused emotional distress that led to his death. The court could
have used this independent evidence for verification. Also, the
statement could have been verified because it was admitted prop-
erly as a statement of present physical condition given to a nurse
for diagnosis and treatment. 08 A court should take into considera-
tion the fact that when a statement comes within two or more ex-
ceptions to the hearsay rule, the exceptions should give support to
each other for verification. A court should not look at each excep-
tion separately and independently for verification as to that partic-
ular exception alone.
The admissibility question concerning spontaneous statements
and the requirement of corroboration has lead to judicial concern
for two important reasons. First, there is concern that the state-
ment was made without reflection and was not the product of the
imagination of the declarant.2 ' Second, there is concern that the
declarant adequately perceived the matter which forms the sub-
stance of the statement and thus had personal knowledge.2 10 The
appropriate vehicle for resolving the corroboration issue is a pre-
liminary fact determination hearing. Prior to the admission of a
present sense impression statement, courts should balance the
amount of detail of the corroborative evidence and the degree to
which the statement appears to satisfy the spontaneity and con-
temporaneity requirement. 21' In deciding upon the appropriate
amount of corroboration in any particular case, the court should
consider the extent to which the uncorroborated details of the dec-
laration are, as a matter of common experience, consistent with the
207. Id. at 218, 494 A.2d at 434.
208. Id. at 222, 494 A.2d at 437. The court concluded that the statement to the nurse
was admissible independently of its admission as an excited utterance. Id.
209. Comment, 10 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. at 310.
210. Id.
211. Comment, 67 IowA L. REV. at 201.
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corroborated facts.21 2 Because the amount of corroborative evi-
dence that is needed will vary from case to case, no precise conclu-
sions can be stated regarding what should be necessary or
sufficient." 3
The degree of corroboration must be at a higher level in criminal
cases. Consideration of another fairly new hearsay exception will
assist in the determination of the adequacy of a corroboration
quantum of evidence. The penal interest exception 21 4 is a modern
day exception to the rule against hearsay. Using the rationale of
this exception, it seems logical that statements used to incriminate
the defendant (in criminal cases for present sense impressions)
should have the same or greater degree of corroboration as state-
ments offered to exculpate the defendant (in the case of declara-
tions against penal interest). It has been suggested in the case of
statements against penal interest that corroborating circumstances
should "clearly indicate" the trustworthiness of the statement by
evidence that demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence
that the declarant's statement is true. 1' Proof of the statement's
truth can be established in many ways including proof of motive or
opportunity for truth telling,216 and by circumstantial evidence, in-
cluding the contents of the statement.217 The trial judge must be
especially careful to make an independent determination as to the
degree of corroboration in criminal cases because fairness and jus-
tice demand that accusations be buttressed by additional corrobo-
rative evidence. In any case, present sense impressions as a matter
of law should not be sufficient evidence on which to convict beyond
a reasonable doubt.2"
212. Id.
213. Id. In In Re Japanese Electronic Products, 723 F.2d 238, 303 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
granted, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1863 (1985), the court stated, "[R]ule [803(1)] is generally
understood to require that, in addition to contemporaneity, there be some corroborating
testimony." In this case the internal memorandum and diary of defendant employee did not
qualify under Rule 803(1) because under the circumstances, there was reason to be skeptical
of the documents and the court refused to admit them solely on the basis of
contemporaneity.
214. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
215. Tague, Perils of the Rulemaking Process: The Development, Application, and
Unconstitutionality of Rule 804(b)(3)'s Penal Interest Exception, 69 GEO. L.J. 851, 900-14
(1981).
216. Id. at 917-20.
217. The declarant must be shown to have firsthand knowledge. See supra note 102
and accompanying text.
218. Commonwealth v. Barnes, 310 Pa. Super. 480, 492-93, 456 A.2d 1037, 1043 (Po-
povich, J. dissenting). Arguments can be made for a 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard
for preliminary fact determinations with regard to the present sense impression in criminal
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The concept of spontaneous statements in the form of present
sense impressions as a special class of evidence under the rubric of
the doctrine of res gestae is an anachronism in the modern theory
of proof.2 19 To speak plainly, there is no "res gestae exception" to
the hearsay rule.220 The continued use of the phrase in modern day
trials is inappropriate and the term should be rejected entirely and
should not be used to explain the admission of hearsay evidence.
The time has long passed to "lay the old aside" as it relates to "res
gestae."
In the past, the Pennsylvania courts have not analyzed the ad-
mission of hearsay evidence closely. Courts in Pennsylvania should
no longer discuss hearsay problems in superficially sophisticated
terms; rather, courts should give hearsay problems the careful con-
sideration that all evidentiary problems deserve. The present sense
impression exception to the rule against hearsay offers a valuable
addition to the probative evidence that can assist the triers of fact
in their deliberations. The question arises as to what quantum of
evidence should be required before a judge admits a present sense
impression. The courts of Pennsylvania have not answered this
question. Yet, there is case law to the effect that the present sense
impression exception is the law of this Commonwealth. 21
Of the twenty-nine states that have enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence,222 at least seven states did not enact Rule 803(1) as
stated in the federal rules.22 1 Ohio and Florida added an additional
phrase to the end of the rule. The Florida Rules state that a pre-
sent sense impression will be admitted "except when such state-
ment is made under circumstances that indicate its lack of trust-
worthiness. ' 224 Ohio adds the phrase "unless circumstances
prosecutions because it is a determination that affects the reliability of the verdict. See
Saltsburg, Standards of Proof and Preliminary Questions of Fact, 27 STAN. L. REv. 217, 272
(1975).
219. Manetta, The Admissibility of Spontaneous Statements in Exception to the
Hearsay Rule, 8 CRIM. L.J. 69, 100 (1984).
220. Commonwealth v. Blackwell, 343 Pa. Super. 201, 208, 404 A.2d 426, 430 (1985).
221. See supra notes 34-54 and accompanying text.
222. See supra note 8.
223. Minnesota, Nebraska and Oregon have omitted the present sense impression ex-
ception altogether. However, in Rule 801(d)(1)(D), Minnesota defines statements of present
sense impression, where the statement describes or explains an event or condition made
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter, as
nonhearsay if the declarant testifies at trial. See MINN. STAT. ANN. Evid. Rule 803(1) (eff.
1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-803 (eff. 1975); ORE. EVID. CODE Rule 803(1) (eff. 1982).
224. FLA STAT. ANN, Evid. Code § 90.801(1).
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indicate lack of trustworthiness" to the end of its rule.22 The Ohio
staff note explains that this phrase serves to narrow the availabil-
ity of the exception by vesting discretion in the trial judge.22 6 This
seems like an appropriate limitation to be placed upon the enact-
ment of the present sense impression exception as the law of
Pennsylvania.
Colorado's Rules of Evidence add the requirement of spontane-
ity and delete the words "or immediately thereafter" found in the
Federal Rules of Evidence.2 7 Colorado's comments explain that
the additional requirement of spontaneity gives a greater guaran-
tee of trustworthiness. 22 Again, this seems to be another appropri-
ate limitation because declarations relating to assertions of past
fact are generally less credible. A declarant's memory may fade
and this gives statements made after an event less credence.
Kansas has limited this exception to civil cases.229 As long as the
evidence proffered under the present sense impression exception
demonstrates the requisite circumstantial guarantees of trustwor-
thiness, it should be admitted to assist the triers of fact in their
deliberations in both civil and criminal cases. This exception
should be used to pave the way for greater liberalization and over-
due simplification in the civil law area. Where the requirements of
trustworthiness and necessity are met, an exception to the hearsay
rule is applicable in criminal cases as well, with proper limitations.
Because of the requirement of the confrontation clause, a dis-
tinction must be drawn between civil cases and criminal cases. In
civil cases, a hearsay statement falling within the present sense im-
pression exception should be admissible without reference to the
availability or unavailability of the declarant. However, as to crimi-
nal cases, there must be a requirement that the declarant is un-
available,230 so as to comport with the requirements of the confron-
tation clause.
In addition, there must be a showing of "reliability" as to the
out-of-court declaration. In both civil and criminal cases, the trial
judge must find that the statement meets the standard of reliabil-
ity. As to civil cases, the standard is that of reasonableness, and
225. Onio R. EVID. Rule 803(1).
226. Id.
227. CoLo. R. EVID. Rule 803(1).
228. Id.
229. KAN. C. C. P. § 60-460(d).
230. This would include refusal to testify, lack of memory, and inability to be present
to testify. See FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
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the requirements of reliability may be proven by the statement it-
self.2 31 But in criminal cases, reliability must be shown under the
due process clause and the requirements of the confrontation
clause.232
The present sense impression exception permits the introduction
of probative information for the trier of fact. For this reason, it is
time for the courts of Pennsylvania to embrace this exception.
Still, thoughtful consideration must be given to appropriate limita-
tions and restrictions to be placed on the exception. This is an ap-
propriate time for the legislature to review and codify the Rules of
Evidence, including an objective evaluation of the present sense
impression exception.
231. Cody v. S.K.F. Industries, Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972). The Cody court
specifically left open the question of whether its holding would apply outside the worker's
compensation area. Id. at 569 n.4, 291 A.2d at 777 n.4.
232. See supra notes 155-80 and accompanying text.
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